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Why Do We Worry About Trace Poisons?*
Allan Mazur**

Introduction
I recall as a child in the 1940's, shopping for shoes with my mother.
To check the fit, all of us -

I, my mother and the salesman

-

peered

down into an x-ray fluoroscope while I wiggled my toes inside the new
shoes. A fluoroscope was also part of routine trips to the pediatrician;
the doctor and my mother would look inside my torso on a glowing
screen. In 1944, physicians shrunk my chronically infected tonsils with
x-rays - a progressive treatment given to thousands of children that
1
decades later was found to cause thyroid cancer.
DDT was widely used in the summers during the 1950's and 60's.
Introduced as a body louse powder during the war, it had successfully
controlled malaria, typhus and other insect-borne diseases among the
troops. Later, its application in the third world saved millions of lives
through the control of malaria, an unprecedented victory over disease
which earned its discoverer, Paul Muller, a Nobel Prize for Medicine in
1948. Now civilians bought "bugbombs" to destroy insects in their
homes and gardens, while trucks and airplanes sprayed clouds of the
inexpensive insecticide over fields and neighborhoods, often using far
more than recommended and carelessly engulfing animals and people.
Most of us didn't care then.
How did we get from there to here? By the 1980's, many had
become so fearful of chemicals and radiation that cynical
commentators began to speak of "chemophobia" gripping America,
with apocalyptic images of trace poisons insidiously seeping though our
2
environment and into our bodies, carrying an epidemic of cancer.
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Increased scientific understanding of environmental hazards must
have played a role, but, if knowledge alone were sufficient to explain
new worries about chronic poisoning, there would be few smokers
today. Historians often point to Rachel Carson's bestselling 1962 book,
Silent Spring, as the fulcrum for these changes and the coalescing event
of the modern environmental movement. 3 Carson's warning that the
misuse of pesticides, particularly DDT, would destroy the songbirds hence a "silent spring" - and perhaps kill people too, brought
widespread public attention to the hazard of trace poisons.
No doubt the book was an important seed, but it did not sprout
from unfertilized ground. America in the 1950's and early 60's
experienced important precursors to Silent Spring. Most salient was the
mass protest movement of the political left against radioactive fallout
from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. 4 At nearly the same
time, but on the political right, was a mass protest against the
fluoridation of drinking water. Antifluoridationists were grassroots
activists, usually successfully trying to influence community decision
making. The fallout protest had a national focus, eventually succeeding
in changing Washington's policy. It engaged many elite activists from
establishment organizations in Chicago and the major cities on the
coasts, thus attaining far more prestige and legitimacy than were ever
accorded the antifluoridation protest. Still, the arguments of both
movements against trace poisons were basically the same.
The Radiation Hazard
Within a year after Wilhelm Roentgen discovered x-rays in 1895,
Thomas Edison set his assistant, Clarence Dally, to work on the
fluoroscope. Frequent exposure to the rays made Dally's hair fall out,
his hands to become ulcerated and eventually cancerous, and finally
killed him. From such experiences, it was thought that radiation had to
inflict ulceration or other gross damage to cause malignancy, and so
long as, e.g., medical workers avoided dosages large enough to produce
5
burns or other severe changes, they and their patients were safe.
2 Edith Efron, The Apocalyptics (1984); Elizabeth Whelan, Toxic Terror (1993)
and Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? (1995).
3 See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire (1993).
4 John Maddox, The Doomsday Syndrome (1972).
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Thus, early workers tested their machines on their own hands as they
began work each day, eventually accumulating massive doses.
Also in 1896, Henri Becquerel showed that a piece of uranium ore
exposed a photographic plate just as x-rays did, a phenomenon called
"radioactivity" by Marie Curie. She and her husband, Pierre, comparing
the radioactivity of uranium ores with that of metallic uranium,
calculated that the ores were more radioactive than expected from their
uranium content. This indicated other radioactive substances contained
in the ores, probably in small quantities. Laboriously refining a ton of
uranium ore, the Curies discovered by 1900 two new elements,
polonium and radium, the latter two million times more radioactive
than uranium and possibly the agent of Marie's death from leukemia.
By the 1920's, the large number of burns, other skin problems and
some cancers indicated that safety standards were desirable for
radiation workers. A group in Britain led the way by recommending
that x-ray and radium workers limit exposure by keeping distance and
lead shielding between themselves and the radiation source, and that
they not work more than seven hours a day or five days per week, or
6
have less than one month's holiday a year.
In 1928, the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) was formed to recommend limits on exposure. Like a series of
groups in the U.S. with which it operated more or less in tandem, the
ICRP eventually became active and credible in setting standards, but at
the outset it simply adopted the British recommendations. At the time
radiation protection was not considered as important as defining units
of measurement. Not until 1934 did the ICRP promulgate a
permissible level of radiation exposure, a limit adequate to prevent overt
skin damage and therefore, it was thought, more dire consequences.
After 1937, it ceased to function, an indication that, as the prewar era
was closing, the radiation hazard was considered to be under control.
The strongest voice of warning in this period of relative
complacency belonged to Harrison Martland who published a series of
studies, beginning in 1925, on what has become one of the most
5
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famous cases of occupational epidemiology - the radium dial painters.
From 1917-24, roughly 800 young women in New Jersey applied
radium-containing paint to watches and clocks so the faces would glow
in the dark. They formed fine brush points by rolling the bristles on
their tongues. Ingesting radium continually over years of employment,
by 1931, eighteen women were dead and others suffered from anemia,
necrosis of the jaw and bone cancer. Often these afflications appeared
years after they had stopped their work as dial painters.
Much of the radium passed out of their bodies, but some was
absorbed and incorporated into bone, which, according to Martland,
was lethal in amounts as small as ten micrograms. "Alpha particles," he
claimed, "are probably the most potent and destructive agent known to
science." 7 Unlike contemporaries who regarded radiation as safe if
8
the exposure was kept low, he emphasized hazards from tiny doses:
A milligram of radium bromide is not much lar er than a
small grain of sand. One microgram is only one thousandth
as large, is invisible, and cannot be detected by any known
chemical method. It is necessary to have only ten
micrograms, or one hundred thousandth of a gram,
distributed over the entire skeleton to produce a horrible
death years after it has been injested.
The practice of radium dial painting was changed when the hazard
became known, but the lesson that trace doses are worrisome was not
widely applied. The use of x-rays for medical diagnosis and therapy
accelerated for conditions as serious as cancer and as minor as infected
tonsils (my own) and acne, exposing probably millions of people to
dangerous amounts of radiation. In the mindset of the time, these all
seemed to be legitimate orthodox medical treatment, not especially
suspect - compared to unorthodox uses of radiation that had also
proliferated. Even Martland did not focus his warning on his colleagues'
9
methods but rather on such practices as:
the sale, usually by quacks, of radio-active waters for the
cure of everything from ingrowing toe-nail and alopecia
areata to the sexual impotence of senescence, high blood
pressure, chronic arthritis and arteriosclerosis.
7 Harrison Martland, The Occurrence of Malignancy in Radioactive Persons, 15
Am. J. Cancer: 2435, 2438 (1931).
8 Id. at 2439.
9

Id. at 2506.
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The Manhattan Project brought more attention than ever before to
problems of safely handling radioactivity, 1 0 and the massive
irradiation of Japanese populations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
produced a terrible natural experiment on the long-term effects of
doses from huge to low levels. By 1950, the ICRP was reorganized, its
focus now on atomic energy and hazards to whole populations rather
than to a relatively few radiologists. The maximum permissible dose
was set in 1950 at half the level adopted in 1934, and, in 1956, it was
again lowered by a factor of about 3 as leukemia reached an abnormally
11
high level among the Japanese exposed to nuclear radiation.
American reactions to the atomic bombs ranged from wonderment
to dread. I grew up with the science fiction of the 1950's in which
mutant monsters, produced inadvertently by nuclear radiation, were
beaten at the end of the movie by a brave young scientist and a
beautiful girl who was the daughter or assistant of a kind and wise older
scientist. Dread came to the fore when the Soviet Union exploded its
first hydrogen device in 1953. The Cold War reinforced a sharp leftright polarization in American politics, each side seeking its own
symbols and issues with which to carry on the debate.
In 1954, a Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, was accidently
showered with fallout from an American hydrogen bomb test,
precipitating first in Japan, then the U.S. and Europe, a leftist political
movement aimed specifically at halting atmospheric testing. More
generally, the movement was an expression of opposition to the arms
race and nuclear confrontation. Adlai Stevenson, the liberal Democrat
campaigning against President Eisenhower, endorsed a moratorium on
tests of hydrogen bombs, warning the nation against fallout - "the
most dreadful poison in the world." 12 Scientists on each side of the
debate disagreed not only over moral and political issues but also over
facts. Proponents of atmospheric testing, e.g., Edward Teller, the
"father of the H-bomb," exaggerated its benefits and minimized its
risks. Opponents did the opposite. Linus Pauling, an outstanding
10 Richard Rhoades, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986) and J. Stannard,
Radioactivity and Health: A History (1988).
11 Lauriston Taylor, History of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP), 1 Health Phys. 97 (1958).
12 Quoted in Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear 202 (1988).
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chemist and an especially influential polemicist, warned of fission
products like strontium 90 that are produced by nuclear explosions and
descend as radioactive precipitation, contaminating grass eaten by cows
and passing in milk to children. He claimed, "There exists a real
possibility that the lives of 100,000 people now living are sacrificed by
each bomb test or series of bomb tests in which the fission products of
13
10 megatons equivalent of fission are released into the atmosphere."
"There is no safe amount of radiation or of radioactive material," he
4
wrote. "Even small amounts do harm."1
The antitesting movement had an enormous effect on perceptions
15
of environmental radiation, as historian Spencer Weart notes:
Fallout was perfectly suited to induce anxiety...,
something that rests upon helplessness and uncertainty, on
the feeling that a threat cannot be escaped nor perhaps even
comprehended before it is too late.... Nor was it just that
radiation was invisible, for so were many other hazards from
chemical poisons to viruses, and indeed Geiger counters
could detect radiation at lower levels of danger than the
levels at which almost any other hazardous agent could be
detected. The worst uncertainty came at the next state,
when you knew that you had absorbed some radiation but
did not know what the effects might be....
Contamination, poison, impurity, pollution, obscenity
more and more people were applying such words to
fallout.... Revulsion against radioactivity, a new attitude
resembling a primitive taboo, like fallout itself was settling
invisibly into every home.
The movement ended abruptly in 1963 when President Kennedy
and General Secretary Khrushchev, frightened by their clash the
previous year over Soviet missiles in Cuba, signed an agreement to halt
the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, easing Cold War
tensions. Many activists shifted their attention to the war in Vietnam.
The concern over low-level radiation went into abeyance to re-emerge
in the late 1960's with the rising protest against nuclear power plants.

13 Linus Pauling, No More War! 108 (1958).
14 Id. at 82.
15 Supra note 13, at 206 and 214.
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Fluoridation
It was noticed in the 1930's that residents of areas where the
drinking water naturally contained fluoride had teeth which tended to
be discolored but also were relatively free of cavities. Further work
showed that if the concentration of flouride was as low as one part per
million (ppm), the benefit of cavity prevention was obtained with
virtually no discoloration. In 1945, the U.S. Public Health Service
(PHS) began experimentally adding fluoride at o-ae ppm to the
drinking water of two cities, intending over the next ten years to
compare their cavity rates to those of control cities. A group of
Wisconsin dentists, enthusiastic over the low rates reported early on,
urged that mass fluoridation be promoted immediately. The PHS first
resisted, saying it would wait for completion of the ten-year
experiment, but soon yielded. By 1951, the American Dental
Association and the American Medical Association had added their
endorsements, urging American communities to fluoridate.
Almost immediately, politically conservative groups in Wisconsin
protested against adding a toxic chemical to their drinking water,
arguing that it was used as rat poison and that involuntary flouridation
amounted to mass medication - a step toward socialism. The
movement spread, gaining strength from the strong conservative
sentiment in the country, which championed Senator Joseph McCarthy
in the 1950's and Senator Barry Goldwater in the 1960's, and then to
other countries. When communities voted in referenda whether or not
16
to fluoridate, usually the measure lost.
From today's perspective, health professionals were reckless to
promote mass fluoridation as early as 1951. Fluoride is indeed an acute
poison, and human data used to evaluate the risk of adding one ppm to
drinking water was more or less limited to crude comparisons of vital
statistics among selected communities with varying levels of naturally
occurring fluoride in the water. 17 If the proposal to fluoridate the
nation's drinking water were made today, supported by the kind of risk
16 Mazur, supra note 1.
17 Hearings of the (House) Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals
in Food Products, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).

By the 1990's it was possible to make a more satisfying case for the safety of

fluoridation; Bernard Wagner, The Health Effects of Ingested Fluoride (1993).
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data available in 1951, I don't believe it would be approved. Health
professionals in 1951 simply were not then as concerned about chronic
exposure to trace poisons.
A popular stereotype of the antifluoridationist as a kook, a fanatic
right-winger, is captured beautifully by the mad General Jack D.
Ripper in Stanley Kubrick's film, Dr. Strangelove. While some
opponents of fluoridation might be so described, respectable scientists,
physicians and others were sensibly cautious about chronic toxic effects.
Yet, few "neutral" commentators gave serious consideration to their
arguments because they had been successfully painted by proponents as
extremists. Psychologists called opposition to fluoridation an "antiscientific attitude." 18 Social scientists studying the controversy often
assumed that informed voters could not rationally oppose fluoridation
and viewed referendum defeats as "democracy gone astray." 19 It is
20
ironic to read this facetious discussion in a sociological study:
[Most]... claims against fluoridation on alleged medical
grounds... have their basis in the fact that in concentrated
dosage fluorine is a poison. When the proponents... try to
argue that one part per million is a highly diluted dose, the
critics reply that the fluoride will collect in out-of-the-way
corners of the water mains to build up to deadly dosages.
The reputed side effects of fluoridation run from
destruction of teeth to liver and kidney trouble,
miscarriages, the birth of mongoloid children, and
psychological disturbances, incuding susceptibility to
communism and nymphomania. When the public-health
officer points out that nearly a tenth of the drinking water in
the U.S. has always had traces of fluoride in it without
causing ill effect, the critics then charge that fluoridation
damages car batteries, rots garden hoses, and kills grass.
It would not sound nonsensical today for someone to express concern
about a "highly diluted dose" of trace poison in their drinking water.
Protests against fluoridation and weapons testing occupied opposite
ends of the political spectrum. So, few if any activists joined both. Yet,
18 Bernard Mausner & Judith Mausner, A Study of the Anti-scientific Attitude,
192 Scientific American 35 (1955).
19 Allan Mazur, Opposition to Technological Innovation, Minerva, Spring 1975, at
58.
20 Robert Crain, Elihu Katz & Donald Rosenthal, The Politics of Community
Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision 4 (1969).
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the risk messages propounded were essentially the same. Both objected
to the involuntary chronic exposure of large populations to low doses of
agents that were known to be very dangerous at higher doses. Both
regarded distant and misguided -

even wicked

-

leaders of

government and industry as responsible for placing populations at risk.
Both accused those parties of ignoring accumulating evidence of
chronic toxicity from low-level exposure. Both envisioned poisons from
man-made technology as insidiously contaminating the purity of
nature. Both emphasized the process of bioconcentration, by which
some trace poisons become increasingly concentrated in species higher
up the food chain. Both saw chemical pollution as a symptom of social
decay. Both worried particularly about cancer. The rhetorics against
fluoridation and radiation are often virtually interchangable. 2 1
Although these elements had long been present in the beliefs of
health food enthusiasts and other small circles, most Americans first
learned of them from the flouridation and fallout protests of the 1950's
and early 60's, if not by direct participation or sympathy with one of
the movements then by their coverage in the mass media.
These elements constitute the ideology of Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring, warning of DDT and other pesticides, produced by corrupt
industry and promoted by misguided government, polluting the purity
of nature, concentrating in animals until they are brought to extinction,
lodging in our bodies, eventually killing us with cancer. Throughout her
book, Carson explicitly compares pesticides with radiation. 22 In her
brief but famous opening chapter, A Fablefor Tomorrow, a happy and
prosperous American town becomes afflicted with a strange blight that
first kills animals, then humans. Afterward, "In the gutters under the
eaves and in the shingles of the roofs, a white granular power still
showed a few patches; some weeks before it had fallen like snow upon
the roofs and the lawns, the field and streams." This is exactly the
imagry of radioactive fallout, now applied to pesticides. Here are other
23
examples from early pages:
Mazur, supra note 1.
22 But not with fluoridation, despite ample opportunity in her discussions of the
urity of drinking water - perhaps because she tried to keep at arm's length... food
faddists, health quacks and other cultists," among whom she may have counted the
antifluoridationists; Frank Graham, Jr., Since Silent Spring 71 (1970).
23 At 6-7.
21
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In this now universal contamination of the environment,
chemicals are the sinister and little-recognized partners of
radiation in changing the very nature of the world - the
very nature of its life. Strontium 90, released through
nuclear explosions into the air, comes to earth in rain or
drifts down as fallout, lodges in soil, enters into the grass or
corn or wheat grown there, and in time takes up its abode in
the bones of a human being, there to remain until his death.
Similarly, chemicals sprayed on croplands or forests or
gardens lie long in soil, entering into living organisms,
passing from one to another in a chain of poisoning and
death.
[R]adiation is now the unnatural creation of man's
tampering with the atom. The chemicals to which life is
asked to make its adjustment are... the synthetic creations
of man's inventive mind, brewed in his laboratories, and
having no counterparts in nature."
If Silent Spring was the font from which flowed the modern
environmental movement and alarm over trace chemicals, it was well
fed by streams of earlier protest.
The Delaney Amendment
One more strand from the 1950's deserves attention in tracing the
roots of worries about chemicals. The "Delaney Amendment" in the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act bans the addition to processed food or
cosmetics24 any chemical shown to cause cancer in man or animals. It
was enacted without much notice in 1958 but has grown in importance,
becoming a focus of controversy. The reason is the great improvement
in methods for detecting traces of a chemical in food. In the 1950's,
chemicals could be detected in parts per million. Anything of lower
concentration was undetectable and therefore, legally, not present. By
the 1990's, analytical methods were a million times more sensitive,
sometimes detecting concentrations as low as parts per trillion. To
appreciate this, consider that one part per million is equivalent to one
drop of poison in 1,000 quarts of water, whereas one part per trillion is
eqivalent to one-thousandth of a drop of poison in one million quarts
of water. Nearly any chemical involved in agriculture or food
processing may leave a residue to be detected at this level and banned if
24 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A) and 376(b)(5)(B), respectively.
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it has been shown carcinogenic in massive doses to laboratory animals,
as is sometimes the case.
Delaney's prohibition takes no account of possible benefits from
chemicals known to cause cancer in rodents; e.g., pesticides or food
preservatives can control disease and damage to foods caused by
bacteria, fungi and insects. Under the Clinton Administration the
Environmental Protection Agency suggested that the Amendment
might be skirted, allowing trace residues in processed food when the
risk of the additive is insignificant and far offset by its benefit. However
in 1993 a court ruled that it must be applied strictly, 2 5 a position
supported by those who worry, like columnist Molly Ivins, 2 6 that
"carcinogens tend to be cumulative - that is, they stay in the body,
and each trace gets added to the next until cancer is touched off."
It seems odd that this first and most absolute protection against
trace poisons carries the name of a conservative Democratic Pol from
working-class Queens. First elected to the House in 1945, James
Delaney had no interest in chemicals during the late 1940's until a
colleague suggested that pesticide contamination of food was ripe for
investigation. The earliest critics of DDT had just begun to express
concern over its rapidly increasing and often careless use. Delaney
convinced Speaker Sam Rayburn to create the Select Committee to
Investigate Chemicals, Presticides, and Insecticides in Food - with
27
himself as chair.
The Committee held hearings during 1950-52, calling experts with
diverse views on the use of chemicals in food, agriculture and cosmetics.
Considerable attention was given to DDT, and after the PHS endorsed
fluoridation in 1951, to that too. Some testimony reads like a tutorial
on toxicology, emphasizing the difference between acute and chronic
8
effects; much warns of the potential danger of chronic exposures. 2
The Committee issued reports on different foci of its investigation, the
one on fluoridation warning communities that the long-term effects of
25 Philip Abelson, Pesticides and Food, 259 Science 1235 (1993). See also, Public
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
26 Molly Ivins, Deregulation: A Question of Money vs. Health, Syracuse PostStandard, July 8, 1995, at A-8.
27 Richard Stalvey, Mr. Delaney Passes a Law, 5 Nutrition Today 29 (1970).
28 Hearings, supra note 17.
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ingestion were unknown. 29 Delaney had become a strong opponent by
1963 if not earlier, calling fluoridation "an unnecessary health risk and
30
unwarranted intrusion on the rights of our citizens."
The amendment did not follow immediately but was introduced a
few years later, when interest in chemicals had grown to the point that
others in the House were then introducing similar bills. All were the
subject of new hearings in which Delaney played little part, 3 1 but in
1958 his version was the one enacted.
Testifying in both 1952 and 1957 was Dr. Wilhelm Hueper, Chief
of the Environmental Cancer Section of the National Cancer Institute.
A crusader as well as an occupational toxicologist, his activities at the
Institute contentious, he believed that trace industrial chemicals were a
major cause of cancer: "The cancer-producing power of one of these
chemicals, betanaphthylamine, is so high that a daily exposure to a few
micrograms for several months may result in the development of cancer
in some exposed workers some 15 to 20 years later." 32 According to
skeptic Edith Efron, 33 Hueper was a participant in a rebellion of
scientists within the federal scientific bureaucracy in the 1960's,
promoting the view that industrial chemicals are the major cause of
cancer that could be eliminated through political action and regulation.
Hueper's views are important because of his influence on Rachel Carson
and, via Carson, on American beliefs about cancer.
Nearing retirement, in 1964 Hueper published with Walter
Conway a treatise entitled Chemical Carcinogenesis and Cancers,
which presents Hueper's long developed philosophy of chemically34
induced cancers. The book opens by calling attention to the
fundamental alterations which modern man has been
making in his environment during the last century by the
addition of numerous... physical and chemical agents.... A
29 James Delaney, Fluoridation of Public Drinking Water, H.R. Rep. No. 2500,
82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
30 121 Cong. Rec. 23,729-33 (1975) (Flouridation and Cancer,statement of Rep.
Delaney).
31 Food Additives: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and Science of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
32 Id. at 370.
33 Supra note 2, at 83.
34 Wilhelm Hueper & Walter Conway, Chemical Carcinogenesis and Cancers 3-4
(1964).
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new and continuously changing artificial, man-made
environment has thereby been created... superimposed upon
the natural one. Through these events.., man is...
increasingly exposed to new harmful inanimate agents
against which he neither possesses adequate natural defense
mechanisms nor has sufficient time to develop them....
Of particular significance... are the often insidious
chronic and long-detayed effects resulting from prolonged
exposures to small or even minute amounts of some of these
agents and not infrequently becoming manifest a few-tomany years after such an exposure has ceased. In fact, some
of these man-made pathogens have been shown to exert
their deleterious toxic, teratogenic and carcinogenic action
through transplacental penetration from the maternal
organism upon the fetus, or they may be introduced into
the infant with the mother's milk. A disturbingly high
number of these newly introduced radiotoxic and
chemicotoxic agents which form a part of the modern
economy and are pollutants of the human environment, are
mutagens and thus may extend their action on members of
future generations....
[Carcinogens are]... an important part of the pathogens
responsible for the development of a new disease panorama
during the past fifty years, which reflects both the beneficial
as well as harmful effects related to the impact of modern
industrialsm upon human health, survival rate and life-span.
Cancers, like all other diseases, are not mysterious
phenomena of spontaneous creation, but are the results of
the action of definite chemical and physical... agents. It,
therefore, should be possible to eradicate cancer hazards and
cancers by preventive and therapeutic measures....
Hueper and Conway regard the unrestrained and increasing
contamination of the human environment with man-made carcinogens
as setting the stage for a "catastrophic" cancer epidemic. 3 5 They name
many substances in the modern environment as causing cancer in
humans, however their evidentiary standard appears to be weak, and at
one point they even suggest that distilled water is a human
carcinogen. 3 6 Their list (Table 5) of "Recognized Occupational and
Environmental Cancer Hazards," running twenty pages, names several
more chemicals than the 36 regarded in 1980 as "established" human
35 Id. at 17.
36 Id atl5.
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carcinogens by the authoritative International Agency for Research on
Cancer of the World Health Organization. 3 7 (Certainly, far more
than 36 chemicals are carcinoginic in humans, but for only 36 was there
sufficient data to make a probable assessment.) Dismissing cigarette
smoking as the overwhelming reason for the alarming increase in lung
cancer during this centry, Hueper and Conway instead implicate
39
38
chemicals that have entered the human economy. They write:
exposures of pregnant mothers and infants to environmental
carcinogenic chemicals, including radioactive agents,
sustained to an increasing degree during recent decades, are
at least in part, responsible for the observed rise in cancers
and especially of leukemias, in childhood.
It is well known that Carson was influenced by Hueper's views,
including his belief that DDT is carcinogenic. She sent him portions of
her manuscript to review and interviewed him personally. 4 0 She
consulted other experts too but seems to have had a special affinity for
41
Hueper, writing in 1959 to her friend Dorothy Freeman:
Did you see that "my" Dr. Hueper received the A.A.A.S.

award in Chicago... for distinguished contributions to the
study of cancer? Overdue recognition, but I'm so glad it
happened. The chemical companies won't be happy. As
perhaps I've told you, I'm giving a full chapter [in Silent
Spring] to the subject of cancer - something I hadn't
expected to do.
I do not know if Hueper was the primary source for Carson's ideas
about chemical carcinogenesis, but her book frequently acknowledges
him as an authority on the subject, and their views are apparently
identical. Her biographer Mary McCay 4 2 suggests that Heuper's
beliefs touched Carson deeply because she was diagnosed with cancer in
1957, given a radical mastectomy in 1960, and treated for the disease
until her death in 1964 amidst the controversy she had ignited.
37 Efron, supra note 2.
38 Supra note 33, at 145.
Modern estimates attribute 80% or more of American lung cancers to smoking
and most of the remainder to naturally occurring radon; Centers for Disease Control,
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, June 19, 1992, at 417.
39 Supra note 33, at 160.
40 Paul Brooks, The House of Live: Rachel Carson at Work 255 (1972).
41 Always, Rachel 295 (Martha Freeman ed. 1995).
42 Mary McCay, Rachel Carson 69 (1993).
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It is worthwhile contrasting the Hueper-Carson view of America's
chemically-caused cancer epidemic, which became widely accepted by
the American public during the 1960's and 70's, with a modern
mainstream epidemiological view. It is true that more Americans than
ever before are contracting and dying of cancer, but this is primarily
because people are living longer today than previously and therefore are
more likely to die from one of the major diseases of old age: cancer,
heart disease or stroke. Furthermore, there has been a remarkable
decrease in deaths from heart disease due to improved prevention and
treatment, its age-adjusted mortality rate in 1987 only 55% what it was
in 1950. Therefore some elderly people who once would have died
from heart disease now survive long enough to contract and die of
cancer. Still, the overall increase in age-adjusted incidence of cancer,
from 1973 to 1987, was only 14.6%, and part of this reflects improved
diagnosis of cancers that once would have gone undetected. The ageadjusted increase in mortality from cancer was smaller - only 5.4%
43
reflecting some improvement in treatment.
Cancer is a catchall term for a variety of diseases, so it makes sense
to look more closely at individual cancer sites. There has been a large
age-adjusted increase in lung cancer, entirely attributable to increases in
smoking after World War II. There are also worrisome increases in the
reported incidence of breast and prostate cancer, in part due to
improved detection, in part unexplained. 4 4 Also, some infrequent
cancers show increases. On the other hand, cancers at other sites
(stomach, cervix, uterus, Hodgkin's disease) show sharp decreases in
incidence and mortality. Overall, there is no general cancer epidemic
that can be attributed to industrial chemicals. Occupational exposures
to specific carcinogenic agents probably account for no more than 4%
45
of cancers in the U.S.
-

43 Brian Henderson, Ronald Ross & Malcolm Pike, Toward the Primary
Prevention of Cancer, 254 Science 1131 (1991).
44 Eliot Marshall, Search for a Killer, 259 Science 618 (1993) and Steven Jacobsen
et al., Incidence of Prostate Cancer Diagnosis in the Eras Before and After Serum
Prostate-specific Antigen Testing, 274 J. A.MA.. 1445 (1995).
45 Richard Doll & Richard Peto, The Causes of Cancer (1981) and Henderson et
al., supra note 43.
Devra Davis et al., International Trends in Cancer Mortality in France, West
Germany, Italy, Japan, England and Wales, and the USA, 336 Lancet 474 (1990)
present a more dire picture that is controversial; see, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Experts
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Furthermore, the emphasis in the 1960's on man-made carcinogens
ignored natural carcinogens in the environment. Today we recognize
that of the many chemicals in the human diet known to be carcinogenic
to rodents (and possibly to humans), far more come from natural
sources, especially from plant toxins and the products of cooking, than
are synthetic. 4 6 Carson mistakenly believed that natural carcinogens
"are few in number," 4 7 that if not for synthetics the environment
would be nearly free of cancer-causing agents, leading her to assert 48
incorrectly - in one of her most quoted passages:
For the first time in the history of the world, every human
being is now subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals,
from the moment of conception until death. In the less than
two decades of their use, the synthetic pesticides have been
so thoroughly distributed through the animate and
inanimate world that they occur virtually everwhere.
Silent Spring
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring is often and justly ranked with Uncle
Tom's Cabin among the outstanding and most influential polemics in
American literature. It has been the primary impetus to changing public
attitudes toward chemicals and to new cautionary policies within
industry and government toward' pesticides and other toxics, and it is
the seed of the modern environmental movement. By 1958 when she
began serious research on Silent Spring, Carson was acclaimed as an
author of books on the sea, especially The Sea Around Us in 1951, and
success brought financial independence. Later charged by her critics
with being unscientific and inaccurate, Carson was in fact educated in
biology through the masters degree and a highly competent science
writer who had worked for years as an editor with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. Silent Spring contains few outright errors, given the
49
scientific information of the day.

Clash Over Cancer Data, 250 Science 900 (1990).
46 Lois Gold et al., Rodent Carcinogens: Setting Priorities, 258 Science 261
(1992).
47 At 219.
48 At 15.
49 Silent Spring Revisited (Gino Marco, Robert Hallingworth & William Durham
eds. 1987).
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One can now fault the book on important points: It is fairly certain
that synthetic chemicals are not a major source of human cancer; no
great increase in age-adjusted cancer rates is seen after smoking and
improvements in diagnosis are considered. 5 0 DDT itself can cause
cancer in rats and mice, but evidence of carcinogenicity in other species
or humans is inadequate. 5 1 Excessive use did hurt certain bird
populations, especially raptors, 52 but obviously Carson was incorrect in
expecting robins - the symbol of spring - to become extinct.
Yet, in an important sense this is beside the point. Carson's primary
claim - that pesticides were flagrantly overused, polluting the environment to a degree that damaged wildlife and possibly threatened human
health - was correct and timely. If she interpreted ambiguous evidence
to favor her thesis, emphasizing lethal effects of pesticides while ignoring benefits, and, if she portrayed overly dire outcomes in alarming
prose, appealing to readers' emotions as well as their reason, that is what
successful polemics are all about. She never claimed to be writing a
textbook. She had a message and conveyed it effectively. In hindsight,
her warning was needed and produced important corrections.
In 1972, the U.S. banned DDT and was emulated by some third
world nations that quickly suffered increases in malaria. Whelan charges
that overzealous followers of Carson, especially the newly organized
Environmental Defense Fund, forced from use one of the most
beneficial chemicals ever invented, one that when applied properly
offered little threat to humans or animals. 53 Carson herself never
advocated a total ban on organic pesticides, acknowledging the need
for pest control. Other federal actions directly spurred by Silent Spring,
and more consensually applauded, were the passage in 1976 of the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 54 requiring that industrial chemicals be
tested for toxicity, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 55 governing disposal of trash and toxics.
50 Henderson et al., supra note 43.
51 National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Summary, Seventh Annual
Report on Carcinogens (1994).
52 Marco et al., supra note 49.
53 Supra note 2.
54 15 U.S.C. § 2601.
55 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.; see Pub.L. 94-580 § 2, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976).
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Carson was not the first to warn about the dangers of pesticides, so
why did Silent Spring have so large an impact? Certainly her skill as a
writer was helpful, as is apparent to anyone who reads her opening
chapters, but, further in, the text becomes densely technical and - my
students testify - boring. Her reputation and connections surely
helped. Her literary agent and her editor at Houghton Mifflin were
personal friends who promoted her work enthusiastically. Together,
they arranged with the editor of The New Yorker - where excerpts
from two of Carson's earlier books had first appeared - to publish
parts of Silent Spring in three weekly installments, beginning June 16,
56
1962. The book was released in September.
The readership of The New Yorker would not then have known a
chlorinated hydrocarbon from a pileated woodpecker, but their interest
in the fallout controversy was high, and pesticides now appeared as a
corollary issue. A July 2 editorial in The New York Times praised
Carson's series, suggesting she was as deserving of a Nobel Prize as was
the inventor of DDT, and, on July 22, in a story headlined Silent
Spring Is Now Noisy Summer, the Times described the uproar in
government, chemical and agricultural circles - all of this two months
before the book was released. The chemical industry was fighting
furiously to discredit Carson, casting among other aspersions that
anyone who questions the widespread use of pesticides can be expected
to oppose fluoridation. 57 Profits aside, DDT had been a boon.
Industry saw itself on the side of the angels, but its efforts succeeded
primarily in bringing more publicity to the controversy.
Part of the impact of The New Yorker series resulted from its
association with the thalidomide tragedy. 5 8 A tranquilizer used in
Europe but not yet approved in the U.S., it was found in 1961 to cause
birth defects when taken by pregnant women, babies being born with
flipper-like stumps instead of arms and legs. On July 15, the same week
that Carson's first article appeared, the thalidomide story became a
national sensation with a front-page story in the Washington Post
telling how one woman, Dr. Frances Kelsey of the Food and Drug
56 Graham, supra note 22; Brooks, supra note 40.
57 Graham, supra note 22, at 164.
58 Graham, supra note 22.
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Administration, had single handedly stood firm against great pressure
and abuse in denying approval, thus saving America from the tragedy
of armless and legless children. 5 9 The parallels with Rachel Carson's
crusade against pesticides were obvious.
The book was released with advance sales of 40,000 copies, its text
complemented with beautiful drawings by Lois and Louis Darling.
Selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club (with Justice William
Douglas contributing an article on the book in the club's newsletter),
the book immediately was a bestseller. Numerous reviews mirrored the
controversy, some raving and others bitterly hostile. In April 1963, CBS
Reports carried an hour-long television program, The Silent Spring of
Rachel Carson, ostensibly telling both sides but actually favoring
Carson. The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature shows an average
of seven articles per year on pesticides in the two years prior to Silent
Spring and an average of over 30 in the three years after.
Skeptics charge that environmental groups, a few writers and
government regulators seized the issue, exaggerating evidence of harm
and repeatedly quoting a handful of pessimistic scientists (including
Hueper) whose views are rejected by scientific consensus. 60 Of particular interest is the claim, popularized in the 1970's, that about 80% of
cancers are environmentally induced, a majority by chemicals. According to Whelan, 6 1 this derives from John Higginson's research during
the 1950's, in which he, comparing the incidence of certain types of
tumors among blacks in Africa and America, concluded from disparities that roughly two-thirds of all cancer had an environmental cause.
By "environmental" Higginson intended cultural as well as chemical
elements, including smoking and diet which are especially important
as well as, e.g., alcohol consumption, sunbathing and sexual patterns.
His findings have been used incorrectly to imply that chemicals are
the major culprit. But it is too facile to dismiss environmentalists'
alarms as cries of wolf. By the 1970's, it was clear that pesticides and
the x-ray had been used recklessly. Radioactive fallout was a hazard.
Toxic pollution of the air, land and water had reached alarming levels.
Wildlife and natural habitat were being destroyed.
-

59 Edward Lawless, Technology and Social Shock (1977).
60 See references in note 2.
61 Supra note 2.
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The increasing tempo of concern over trace doses may be seen from
Lawless' survey 6 2 of 45 public alarms and controversies over
technology reported in the U.S. press from the end of World War II
until 1973. Twenty-seven involved a chronic trace poison, either
chemical or radioactive. Of these, only four began in 1945-55
(diethylstibestrol, fluoridation, shoe fluoriscopes and DDT) and five in
1955-65 (tainted cranberries, polio vaccine hazard, thalidomide,
medical x-rays and taconite pollution). Eighteen began in the eight-year
period 1965-73 (including mercury in tuna, asbestos, nuclear weapons
tests and nuclear power).
Therefore it should not be surprising that by the mid-1970's, the
hazard of trace poisons had a firm foothold on the nation's agenda of
problems. The trouble for policy makers was, and remains, to identify
and deal with real problems without wasting resources on false alarms.

62 Supra note 59.

